The Skulking Way of War: Technology and
Tactics among the New England Indians.
Bernard W. Sheehan
Book Review: Summary
For good reason, anthropologists and
historians in recent years have tended to
deemphasize warfare in the relations between
Europeans and Indians in the New World.
For good reason, anthropologists and historians in recent years have tended
to deemphasize warfare in the relations between Europeans and Indians in the
New World. Not only did the two peoples deal with each other in a variety of
other ways - trade, diplomacy, proselytization, etc. - but without doubt,
the major reason for the decline of the native population after its
encounter with Europeans was not war but disease. Nonetheless, hostility
between whites and Indians remained a significant reality until late in the
nineteenth century.
Malone discusses the effects of these conflicts on both societies. For the
Indians the consequences were devastating. Their populations dwindled, and
their cultures unraveled. Malone also points out that the colonists changed
their style of fighting in response to the Indian method. For once the
conventional view turns out to be true; the colonists eventually abandoned
their formal procedures and adopted the Indians' "skulking way." This
European concession to native culture, however, did not alter a far more
significant change that flowed in the other direction - a scale of
destruction that spread untold havoc among the native people.
Indians fought regularly and for a variety of reasons (Malone lists eight of
them on pages 9-10); they came from warrior societies. But before the
arrival of the whites, they sought neither the ruin of their foes nor
decisive victory. Europeans, to the contrary, fought to make further war
unnecessary. With their populations already in decline, the native bands
could ill afford the prodigality of such a policy. Two technical changes
contributed significantly to Indian misfortunes - European guns, which
killed many more people than arrows did, and the adoption of European
fortifications, which concentrated the Indian population, making them more
vulnerable to attack than they were when scattered in small groups
throughout the forest.
Nevertheless, the Indians held their own against superior forces and
weapons. They were not defeated until 1676. After all, male Indians were
professional soldiers, schooled from childhood in the art of forest war, and
they were extraordinarily adaptable to the new situation, learning even the
metallurgy necessary to fix the white man's firearms. Europeans were farmers
and artisans who were badly trained in the ways of combat, and they were
slow to adjust in the face of change. In the end, they developed a small
cadre of forest fighters, used Indian allies judiciously, and overwhelmed
their enemies with technological proficiency and strength of numbers.
Although much has been written on Indian war in New England - works by
Leach, Vaughan, and Salisbury come to mind - no other author has treated the
subject with as much anthropological and technical detail as Malone. He
gives a succinct and intelligent view of a subject that is often ignored or
seen merely from the outside.(1)
Bernard W. Sheehan Indiana University
1 Douglas E. Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip's War
(New York, 1958); Alden Vaughn, New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians,
1620-1675 (Boston, 1965); Neal Salisbury, Manitou and Providence: Indians,
Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500-1643 (New York, 1982).
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